The Pentagon’s New Map
A recent book by Thomas Barnett, “The
Pentagon’s New Map,” is evidently receiving much attention as an authoritative
guide for military planning. Although
there is much truth in the ideas and themes contained in this work, some of its
conclusive statements are the essence of naiveté and, worse, dangerous if they
are taken as truth.
To start with the kernel of truth evident
in the first one hundred or so pages, Mr. Barnett correctly assesses the
essence of the forces driving the current security dilemma. The world is indeed encountering a clash
between those who cling to an ever vanishing world of tradition and stability,
the symbol of which Thomas Friedman so eloquently portrayed as the olive tree,
and those embracing as well as trying to keep pace with the ever accelerating
forces of globalization, alternately portrayed as the “Lexus.” He is also correct in assessing that central
to this clash is a radical contest between the rule sets which govern what is commonly
viewed as acceptable behavior. The rules
are indeed changing, both for war as well as for commerce and a host of
additional endeavors. Mr. Barnett goes
one giant step forward, however, in his assertion that “state-on-state wars
have effectively gone the way of the dinosaur…,” as well as in his assertion
that war between states possessed of nuclear weapons is an impossibility – “Nukes
effectively ended great-power war…”
To accept these assertions as fact is
dangerous indeed. Mr. Barnett far too
easily discounts the potential which remains for state v state war. In fact, he discounts its possibility. Although a real dilemma exists with how to be
prepared both for conventional state v state war as well as the host of
additional challenges which we currently face, it is a most dangerous
proposition, if followed, that the former are, if possible at all, only very
remotely so. Whether we wish it to or
not, the dilemma persists. We must be
prepared for both although we cannot sustain a commitment to both without risking
overstretch.
The real challenge, then, is not only
determining how best to manage as well as shape the transition to a new rule
set, but also how to survive the transition without ending up in both an
economically and geopolitically much weakened position. Such an achievement, given current realities,
cannot be accomplished by relying solely, or even predominantly, on US power
and capabilities alone. We must, if only
in our self interest, work multilaterally to prevent the numerous flash points
of unrest from fanning into ever greater flames of regional instability which
will, as they have, affect us all. We
must also be prepared to protect our national interests against the continued
presence of conventional threats which, although conventional, will not rely
solely on conventional means but rather, by combining conventional power with asymmetric
capabilities, will seek to achieve their aims.
Although Mr. Barnett presents some compelling
social trends in his analysis, it would be folly to assume that society
progresses along such deterministic paths.
The rule set reset is indeed still occurring. It is still not clear what new set will
evolve. In the interim, presupposing the
outcome, as well as the extinction of state v state war even within what he
describes as the core, is both an oversimplification as well as a dangerous
proposition on which to base defense planning.
As well, his dismissal of military requirements to support national
policy in regards to defense agreements as limitless national interest puts the
straw on the wrong camel’s back.
Regardless of their advisability in regards to national interest, there
are defensive requirements which our military is tasked to be prepared to fulfill. Regardless of its presumptive title, I hope
Mr. Barnett’s book is being read with several grains of salt by our military
planners.