Means and Ends
It is heartening to see
debate beginning on the formation of public policy to deal with issues which
have arisen as a result of the increased threats posed by terrorism. Public policy think tanks have begun to formulate
recommendations in light of these developments.
The issues are difficult as well as important as they deal with both the
real and spreading threat as well as the impacts on our democratic way of life
which our responses to this threat potentially create. As we engage in these discussions, it is important that we proceed
with caution as to the long term impacts of some of our responses to the
proximate threats as well as include sound moral reasoning in evaluating the
ends we seek and the means we intend to use to achieve them. It is a debate that must be bound by law, the
restraints embodied within the values upon which our nation was founded, and
our Constitution. To claim victory over
those who would terrorize our population at the expense of these laws and
values would be a pyrrhic victory indeed.
The difficulty of the debate lies not only
in the challenge of balancing responses to proximate threats against long term
impacts on our society. Pragmatic,
objective analysis is both necessary as well as something we are quite
accustomed to and good at. The
difficulty also lies, however, in the fact that common discourse in moral
reasoning and the philosophical underpinnings of our democracy have long since
fallen out of vogue or, worse, been reasoned to be outdated or simply
erroneous. When weighing alternatives,
how do we define the greater good? What
is good? What is justice? What truths are self evident? What are our natural rights besides the ones
that our founding fathers have specifically enumerated? How can we know them? If we really had to choose all over again,
would we really value our liberty more than our security? All of these questions are not specifically
relevant to determining our current course; however, the philosophical underpinnings
whereby they were answered in the past are.
One of the questions that must be dealt
with is that of the use of torture. I
have spoken to many who firmly believe that it can be
justified, although I have not heard any give a full explanation of their
reasons for coming to this conclusion.
The justifications are either understandably emotional reactions to the
horrific acts which we have witnessed by those using violence, or limited to
truncated utilitarian reasoning which justifies the use of this means for the
greater good. I characterize the
reasoning as truncated because it normally stops far short of any definition of
the good, any characterization of the value of the means in and of itself, any
clear reasoning as to the actual utility of the means in achieving the end
sought, any consideration of the possibility of alternatives, and any
consideration of the long term negative impacts or second and third order
effects which would alter the purely cost benefit view normally being used. Additionally, it normally does not consider
accountability, responsibility and oversight issues which,
should we adopt such means and empower people to use them in our names,
must be considered.
There are many other issues to consider in
addition to coercive methods to obtain information. I have focused on this one because it lends
itself to the use of clear examples of the extreme case, which examples often
provide insight into the issues at hand.
For instance, one example frequently used to justify torture is that of
a terrorist who has planted a nuclear bomb in a city which he states is set to
explode. Is the use of torture justified
as a means in obtaining information from the captured terrorist about the
location of the bomb? Clearly, if that
information can be obtained and the bomb defused, the pain inflicted on the
detainee would result in the saving of thousands of lives. It is a common means ends issue. Does the means, the use of torture on an
individual, justify the ends, the saving of thousands of lives?
First consider the end. The judgment made in its evaluation is that
it is a real good which we should seek.
The reason it is a real good which we should, or are under a moral
obligation to, seek is that it is a natural right of human beings, a truth we
hold as self evident. This highlights
the importance of the foundational principles upon which our nation was
founded. They are principles which have
their roots in Aristotelian philosophy.
They are also principles which many no longer believe to be valid. Are there self evident truths, those which
exist apart from objective reality, which put us under a moral obligation? Do we really have natural rights? Of what do they consist and how can we know
them? If we no longer believe these
philosophical underpinnings of our democracy to be valid, on what foundation
does it rest? One, which is often used
in discussions of the topic at hand is utilitarianism, or, in a simplified
form, the greatest good for the greatest number. Regardless of which philosophical
underpinnings we use as justification, although I believe natural right theory
still to be valid, it is clear that some judgment about the value of the end
must be made in regards to its goodness and our obligation to seek it. The end must be a good which we consider we
have an obligation to seek.
Let’s take the scenario to a further
extreme. Consider that it is known that
the terrorist has an infant child which he loves dearly. Assume also that we believe the terrorist to
be very committed to his cause and willing to both suffer and die for it. Would it be justified to torture his child in
his presence in order to get him or her to reveal the information we seek? I normally do not get to this point in
discussions with people about the topic; however, when I have, the typical and
immediate response is no. The child is
innocent whereas the terrorist is not.
This is a revealing response.
What it reveals is a judgment about the inherent value
of the means, in this case the torture of an innocent, and a judgment that
there are some means which are inherently evil.
So we have two considerations so far in our justification of torture. The end must be a real good which we are
under a moral obligation to seek and the means must not be inherently evil.
As we have thrown away the baby, so to
speak, in our considerations, what about the terrorist? We have already assumed him to be extremely
committed to his cause and willing to suffer and die for it. How certain are we that, by use of torture,
we will obtain the information we seek?
Assume we know quite a bit about this particular terrorist. We have studied him or her for years, and we
know of certain fears and phobias the terrorist has. Certainly, if we view that the use of torture
on the terrorist is not evil inherently and intend its use, then we would
certainly consider the form of pain we intended to inflict in regards to which
would most likely obtain the response we were seeking. A third and important consideration which
this highlights is the connection between the means we intend to use and the
end we seek. If there is any question as
to the nature of the means, then surely there must be a high degree of
probability that it will achieve the good we seek.
Let’s assume further. Assume that the terrorist has stated, and we
have solid evidence to believe this statement to be highly credible, that the
bomb is set to explode in seven days rather than hours. Assume also that we have established the
general location of the device, and have the means within this time to search
the area thoroughly, although even so its location may elude us. If we had already determined that torture was
justified without additional considerations, this would be a moot point. Surely, using only utilitarian
considerations, we should not count on luck alone but should use every means
available without delay. However, most
would agree that this assumption brings up another consideration. We must consider the alternatives
available. In this case, we have time as
well as other means. So far then, we
have these considerations. The end must
be a real good. The means cannot be
inherently evil. There must be a high
degree of probability that the means we intend to use will achieve the ends we
seek. There must be no
alternatives.
Let’s make another assumption. The nuclear device is a dirty bomb. We know its general area and the potential
for contamination. We have also
determined that, although its effects can be lethal, the potential for
fatalities in this case is extremely small, although harmful health effects
will occur to those exposed, a moderately small number
of people. In this case, we have changed
the end. It is now to preserve health,
not life, as well as the population’s sense of security and their perception of
the government’s ability to provide for it.
A loss of confidence in the government’s ability to provide for the
security of its people can have very significant long term impacts in a stable
country, those impacts being much more dramatic in one that is not stable. For arguments sake, let’s consider this
country in the latter category. So now
we have multiple ends, both long term as well as short term, the longer term
end, the peace and stability of a civil society, of much less
predictability. Consider, as well that
the terrorist is a national, and the countries use of heavy handed tactics with
its population is one important reason for its lack of stability. What I am trying to examine, although the
example may be imperfect, is the existence of conflicting, multiple ends and
the potential impact of second or third order effects and unintended
consequences. We must not only look to
the immediate good which we seek, but also to the total good, or opposite,
which may result as a consequence of use of the means in question.
Here, then, are the considerations we have
discussed. The end must be a real
good. The means cannot be inherently
evil. There must be a high degree of
probability of success in attaining the end through the questionable, though
assumed not inherently evil, means.
There must be no alternatives.
The total good must be weighed.
Considering these standards in relation to the use of torture, it begins
to become evident that, if justifiable at all, those circumstances in which it
might conceivably be justified are extremely small, if they exist at all. If they do exist, and we intend to use such means,
then one last consideration must be taken.
Responsibility, accountability and oversight must be established. As we live in a democracy, the accountability
is ours collectively. This cannot occur
unless our representatives are given strict oversight authorities. For all of those who believe torture to be a
justifiable means, I question whether they would continue to maintain that
position so adamantly if they were the ones to be held accountable for its
use. We have, collectively, become far
too prone to find fault with the actions of our government without considering
our own part in its failings.
Congressional oversight responsibilities for covert actions have been
shirked, the reasoning somehow being made that, if I don’t know about it, I
cannot be held to account if something goes wrong. This cannot be further from the truth. You can’t delegate accountability. We, through our elected representatives, are
collectively accountable for the actions of our government. If we have hidden our heads in the sand or
allowed Congressional oversight authorities to lapse, we are at fault. If we have delegated the responsibilities and
not ensured that they are being carried out, we are at fault. If we have allowed our representatives to
shirk their responsibilities in this regard, we are at fault and, accept it or
not, we are being held to account by others with whom we share this planet and
towards whom we supposedly stand as a beacon of hope for the attainment of
those things which we all, by virtue of our common humanity, really need; life,
liberty, and the pursuit of all of those other real goods which we all need to
make a good life for ourselves.
It is heartening that serious folk have
begun to debate these issues. It is good
and right that such debate should lead to policy recommendations. It would be better were such debate not
restricted to the halls of academia and the think tanks of